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ESTIMATION OF REVEALED PROBABILITIES AND UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
FOR PRODUCT SAFETY DECISIONS 
W. Kip Viscusi and William N. Evans* 
Abstract-Using survey data on consumer product purchases, this paper 
introduces an approach to estimate jointly individual utility functions and 
risk perceptions implied by their decisions. The behavioral risk beliefs 
reflected in consumers' risky decisions differ from the stated probabilities 
given to them in the survey. These results are not consistent with a 
Bayesian learning model in which the infonnation respondents utilize is 
restricted to what the survey presents. The results are, however, potentially 
consistent with models in which prior risk infonnation is influential or 
models in which people do not act in a fully rational manner. 
I. Introduction 
A FUNDAMENTAL concern in decision analysis and the 
economics of risk and uncertainty is the structure of 
individual utility functions. This prominence, in turn, has led 
to the development of procedures to estimate the structure of 
utility functions. Perhaps the most widely used approach is 
to present individuals with a series of hypothetical ex- 
amples, ascertain their responses, and estimate the utility 
function implied by this behavior.1 This technique presup- 
poses, however, that individuals view the probabilistic 
information presented to them as being fully informative. 
The nature of utility functions and the rationality of 
preferences more generally have also been the focus of a 
large literature on choice under uncertainty. A wide range of 
studies has documented a variety of forms of irrationality 
and systematic errors in uncertain decisions.2 Most of this 
literature is based on various kinds of experimental evidence 
in which respondents consider a series of hypothetical 
lotteries, which is a methodological approach not too 
dissimilar from the use of reference lotteries to determine 
individual utility functions.3 In each case the analysis is 
based on an assumption that individuals treat probabilistic 
information at face value and process it accurately. Under 
these assumptions, information on subsequent decisions 
provides evidence on the structure of individual preferences. 
The assumption that probabilistic information is pro- 
cessed accurately and treated as being fully informative may 
not, however, be accurate. This paper extends the analysis in 
Evans and Viscusi (1991) by introducing a new econometric 
procedure for simultaneously estimating the probabilities 
implicit in uncertain choices and the utility functions 
revealed by these decisions. The primary benefit of our 
technique is that it does not treat the probabilistic informa- 
tion at face value. The primary contribution of this paper is 
methodological in that it introduces what, to the best of our 
knowledge, is the first approach to jointly estimating prefer- 
ences and risk perceptions. We also will derive insights for 
consumer risk. As we illustrate below, our results are 
potentially consistent both with broadly defined Bayesian 
models and with the literature on irrational choice. The 
estimation illuminates the specific aspects of perceptional 
relationships that generate the departure from a perfect 
information reference point. 
Section II develops an empirical model for a consumer 
product survey examined in this review by Evans and 
Viscusi (1991) in which respondents were told the risk 
associated with various consumer products. We then develop 
a structural model that tests whether these probabilities are 
taken at face value or whether individuals incorporate the 
stated probabilities within the context of a Bayesian learning 
process.4 The empirical results reported in section III 
simultaneously estimate both the risk perceptions revealed 
through individual decisions as well as the structure of 
utility functions, thus eliminating the distorting effect of 
perceptional biases. The revealed probabilities exhibit a 
pattern that we term the "probability compression effect." 
High probabilities are muted, and low probabilities are 
raised. 
II. Modeling of Behavioral Probabilities 
for Consumer Choice 
The survey used in the Evans and Viscusi (1991) study 
that will be examined here involves probabilities stated in 
the survey. This approach is the norm for experimental 
studies that present individuals with hypothetical lotteries 
and elicit choices among them. We will focus on how these 
stated probabilities correspond to the probabilities people 
assess after receiving this information. The estimation 
approach presented below explicitly explores the risk beliefs 
implicit in consumer choices. 
To examine the role of perceptional biases, we will use a 
large set of consumer survey data dealing with the risks 
posed by two household chemical products-toilet bowl 
cleaner and insecticide. These data sets are based on the 
price responses of several hundred representative consumers 
to different possible formulations of these household chemi- 
cals.5 Each product involved a pair of nonfatal risks j = 1, 2, 
Received for publication July 28, 1993. Revision accepted for publica- 
tion February 19, 1997. 
* Harvard Law School and University of Maryland, respectively. 
1 See Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Kleindorfer et al. (1993) for a lucid 
overview of this work. 
2 See, among others, Combs and Slovic (1974), Fischhoff et al. (1981), 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kunreuther et al. (1978), Lichtenstein et 
al. (1978), Machina (1987), Viscusi (1992), and Kleindorfer et al. (1993). 
3 See Raiffa (1968) for a discussion of this approach. 
4For a review, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Fischhoff et al. 
(1981), Viscusi (1992), and Kleindorfer et al. (1993). 
5 These original data sets were developed by the senior author of this 
paper in research he directed for the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency. The sample characteristics are reported in Viscusi et al. (1987) and 
Magat and Viscusi (1992, chap. 2). The latter publication also reports 
telephone survey results on actual product usage as a validity test of the 
relationship between the survey responses and actual consumer behavior. 
The adult consumer samples used focus on the household chemical risks to 
adults, not the smaller samples involving risks to children. There were 508 
observations in the toilet bowl cleaner sample and 607 in the insecticide 
[ 28 1 ? 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
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TABLE 1.-SUMMARY OF CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS 
Baseline Risk per New Product Risk per 
Survey 10,000 Bottles 10,000 Bottles 
Question P1 P2 S1 52 
1 15 15 0 15 
2 15 15 15 0 
3 15 15 0 0 
4 15 15 10 10 
5 15 15 5 5 
which were gassings and eyebums for toilet bowl cleaner 
and inhalations and skin poisonings for insecticide. 
The survey informed respondents that the per-bottle 
baseline risk value pj was 15/10,000 for each of the two risks 
of the products. The survey then inquired about the respon- 
dent's view of some safer variants of the product posing 
risks sj for each of the two risks. Table 1 summarizes the five 
different ways in which the baseline risks were altered. 
These experimental treatments were the same for both 
products. Each respondent considered all five treatments for 
only one of the products listed in table 1. The value of sj 
varies from 0 to 15/10,000.6 
It is usually assumed in studies such as this that respon- 
dents treat the value of sj as representing the risks of the 
product. If this is the case, then in effect the respondent's 
prior risk assessment is given a zero informational weight, 
whereas there is an infinite relative weight on the survey 
value of sj in forming the respondent's assessment of the 
risk, which we denote by qj. In his prospective reference 
theory model, Viscusi (1989, 1992) hypothesized that respon- 
dents may not take the sj amounts at face value but instead 
may treat this amount as providing partial information in a 
quasi-Bayesian context. 
Two possibilities will be considered. In case 1 we test 
whether individuals restrict their information to what they 
are told in the survey, including both the initial baseline risk 
and new risk information for the reformulated product. In 
case 2 we test whether respondents augment information 
presented in the survey with their own risk beliefs so that 
risk assessments based on prior knowledge, initial risk 
information, and new product risk information may all be 
consequential. 
Consider first the learning process for case 1. The notation 
used is as follows. Let the value of pj be the prior risk 
assessment, and sj the risk implied by new information. 
Suppose that respondents attached some precision y to the 
baseline risks pj, where y is equivalent to the number of 
draws from an urn that this information represents. We 
assume that probabilities can be characterized using a beta 
distribution, which is ideally suited to Bernoulli-type pro- 
cesses since it can assume a wide variety of skewed and 
symmetric shapes. Similarly, t denotes the precision of sj. 
Respondents weight the probabilities as if the value of pj 
were based on y draws from a Bernoulli urn, and sj were 
based on t draws, so that the total information content 
available is y + t.7 For the beta family of distributions, the 
posterior risk assessment qj will be given by 
qj = i +ei= y pi+ Sj (1) 
where y' = -y/(y + t) and t' = t/(y + t). The y' and i' 
terms consequently are the fractions of the total information 
accounted for by the baseline probability pj and the new 
information sj. 
Individuals are, however, assumed to treat probabilities of 
O and 1 at face value. Certain events do not get filtered 
through some risk perception process. As a result, qj(sj = 0) = 
O and qj(sj = 1) = 1, as in Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) 
prospect theory and Viscusi's (1989) prospective reference 
theory. For bothj = 1, 2, the value of pj equals 15/10,000. 
Case 2 is a variant of this learning formulation in which 
respondents do not restrict their beliefs to the information 
given to them in the survey. Instead, they approach the 
survey with some baseline prior beliefs drawn from their 
general knowledge and previous experiences. Thus they 
enter the survey with a risk perception r and associated 
precision 4i. Since the survey was only given to respondents 
who used the household chemical products, it is likely that 
respondents have some prior risk beliefs about these prod- 
ucts. 
The value of the posterior risk assessment in this instance 
will be 
4ir + ypj + -sj ir if 
qj = - + r + y"pi + t Si (2) 
where 
+ l+ ' + 
___+y+ 
The values of tJ!, y", and t" are the proportions of the risk 
information accounted for by the consumer's prior beliefs, 
the base risk value, and the new risk value, respectively. The 
denominator used to determine the fraction of information 
from each source is larger than under case 1, as it now 
includes the informational content of prior risk beliefs as 
well. 
The empirical formulations for cases 1 and 2 are summa- 
rized in table 2. The equation generating the posterior risk 
sample. The survey was administered by a market research firm, and the 
sample characteristics closely parallel those of U.S. consumers nationally. 
6 The survey also included an experimental treatment in which the risk 
was increased. However, this treatment led to alarmist responses, which 
Viscusi et al. (1987) called "reference risk effects." Including these 
responses would add a shift term to the perception function to reflect the 
discontinuity in risk beliefs when risks are increased. 
7The values of y and E are assumed to be the same for each of the two 
product risks since the informational context in which the risks are 
presented in the survey is identical. 
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TABLE 2.-SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL MODELS 
Case 1 
Consumers Case 2 
Use Information Consumers 
Contained Only Incorporate 
Parameters of Interest in Survey Prior Risk Beliefs 
1. Posterior risk assess- qj = y'pj + t'sj qj = d"rj + Y''pj + ("s 
ment qj 
2. Equation to estimate qj = ox + sj qj = ox + 3sj 
3. Interpretation of para- O( = Y'pj Ox = "r; + Y'fpj 
meters a and ,3 = E3 e = El 
4. Constant term/initial risk oi/p =_ & = ry' OWlp_ & = "rjlp; + y" 
Definitions: 
pj = baseline risk (15/10,000) for all cases 
sj = new risk 
rj = prior risk perception 
, = posterior risk perception 
assessment, listed in row 1 of the table, is different in the two 
cases. Because the initial risk is pj = 15/10,000 for both 
product hazards, the role of the baseline risk term in 
equations (1) and (2) can be captured through a constant 
term. For the case 2 model this constant term also reflects 
prior risk beliefs. The equation identified by the survey is 
therefore 
qj= ac + sSj. (3) 
Thus for cases 1 and 2, our approach yields estimates of a 
constant term and a coefficient of the new risk information. 
Item 3 in table 2 indicates how the differing ways prior 
information is incorporated into the posterior risk assess- 
ment necessitate a different interpretation for the parameters 
ac and ,B across the two models. In case 1 the constant term ac 
captures the influence of the initial risk information, and for 
case 2, the role of any prior risk beliefs. The new risk 
information coefficient 1 indicates the relative weight placed 
on the information for the new product, where the only 
difference between cases 1 and 2 is that for case 2 the 
relative weight on this information is with respect to a larger 
information base. Finally, as indicated in item 4 in table 2, 
the estimated constant term ac divided by the initial risk 
(15/10,000) equals the relative weight y' on the initial risk 
under case 1. For case 2 this value equals the relative weight 
y" plus a term reflecting the influence of prior risk beliefs. 
We will denote the ratio of ot to 15/10,000 by (x. 
III. Estimation of Probabilities 
Consumers faced with the new risk values presented in 
table 1 were asked what price premium they were willing to 
pay for the safer product. These responses establish an 
equality between the expected utility of the original product 
and the expected utility of the safer product, which will be 
used to estimate the nature of the probabilities revealed 
through this behavior. 
In Evans and Viscusi (1991) we show that for this set of 
consumer data one cannot reject the hypothesis that these 
minor health losses are tantamount to monetary equivalents. 
Let Li be the monetary equivalent loss for injury I, and WK 
(K = 1, . . ., 5) be the respondent's willingness to pay for 
the formulation described in question K (see table 1). We 
present the formulation of the econometric model for case 1 
(where the only information utilized by respondents is that 
given to them in the survey); the formulation for case 2 is 
analogous. Since Pi = P2 = 15/10,000, the initial risk level 
will be denoted by p. Finally, let N be the number of bottles 
of the product the respondent used per year. The survey 
structure ascertained the price change necessary to keep the 
subject on the same indifference curve and to continue to 
purchase the product. In the estimation, we assume that any 
income effects resulting from the small price changes 
involved in the survey are sufficiently small that quantity 
change effects can be ignored. 
The survey ascertained the consumer's additional annual 
willingness to pay for the new safer product as opposed to 
the original product. The equality between the willingness to 
pay for injury reduction in annual expected injury costs for 
each of the five product variants is given by8 
WI = pNLI (4a) 
W2 = pNL2 (4b) 
W3 = pN(LI + L2) (4c) 
W4 = (p - qj)N(LI + L2) (4d) 
where qj is evaluated at sj = 10/10,000, and 
W5 = (p - qj)N(LI + L2) (4e) 
where qj is evaluated at sj = 5/10,000.9 
In each case, the expected injury cost is the product risk 
associated with the particular product, the number of bottles 
used, and the monetary equivalents loss. For product formu- 
lations 3, 4, and 5, there are two possible types of injuries, 
8 These equations are derived using first-order Taylor series expansions 
of arbitrary utility functions. The procedure is outlined in Evans and 
Viscusi (1991). These equations can also be obtained if one assumes 
risk-neutral utility. In Evans and Viscusi (1993) we derive expressions 
equivalent o equations (4) for a constant absolute risk aversion (exponen- 
tial) utility function. In that model we demonstrate that the risk aversion 
parameter is extremely small, but is estimated imprecisely, and we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that consumers are risk neutral and treat the outcomes 
as monetary equivalents. Using estimates from linear, logarithmic, and 
exponential utility models, we also demonstrated in Viscusi and Evans 
(1990) that the parameters of the monetary loss equivalent function are 
invariant o the assumed form of utility. 
I Because we assume that risk perceptions are accurate if stated risks are 
zero, risk perception parameters are absent from equations (4a) and (4b), 
and we can therefore identify the parameters for LI and L2 using these two 
equations. Having identified these parameters, we then use the responses 
for the partial reduction in risks in equations (4d) and (4e) to identify 4i"r + 
yPypj and t". Because the risk perception variables are multiplicative 
constants in the equations of interest, we only have two equations from 
which to identify these parameters. Therefore we are unable to identify 
distinct r's for each injury. 
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whereas for products 1 and 2, there is only 1. The per-bottle 
risks are the same for products 1, 2, and 3, but the injury 
probability is less for products 4 and 5. Some of the 
valuation amounts are zero, as some respondents are not 
willing to pay extra for the additional safety improvement.'0 
The presence of zero values is not a tobit situation since 
there is no reason to believe that respondents are being 
censored from giving negative values to what is an unambigu- 
ous product safety improvement. 
As in Evans and Viscusi (1993), we allow for the 
possibility that the monetary loss equivalent value of injuries 
Lk (k = 1, 2) is a function of income, where 
Lk =4Ok + 4Y + 4kY2, k = 1, 2. (5) 
The econometric task is to incorporate the functional forms 
for qj from equations (1) and (3) and Lk from equation (5) 
into the system of equations (4a)-(4e). Estimation of these 
five equations will consequently produce joint estimates of 
both the risk perception functions and individual utility 
functions. We estimate this set of equations using nonlinear 
iterative seemingly unrelated regressions (ITNSUR)." The 
iterative aspect arises as estimates of the equation system 
and the associated covariance terms are obtained, and the 
equations are reestimated until stable parameter estimates 
are obtained. The only parameters to be estimated are the 
risk perception function parameters from equations (1) and 
(3) and the loss function parameters from equation (5). 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the toilet bowl 
cleaner sample and the insecticide sample. The upper panel 
presents the perception parameters, and the lower panel 
presents the utility function parameter estimates. The inter- 
pretation of the results is most straightforward using case 1, 
in which the risk beliefs are based only on the survey 
information. The estimation procedure yields values of , 
and of a/(15/10,000), or a. The value of 13 equals the weight 
on the new risk information for both cases 1 and 2. As 
indicated in table 2, the coefficient & corresponds to the 
weight y' on the initial risk p (case 1) and a more 
complicated expression involving y" for case 2. In both 
samples, these coefficients are positive and significantly 
different from both 0 and 1 (95% confidence interval). 
Consider the implications for the case 1 model. One can 
reject the following extreme hypotheses: the new experimen- 
tal information regarding the altered product is taken at face 
value (y' = 0, ,B = 1, or the survey provides perfect informa- 
tion), respondents ignore the experimental information 
('y' = 0, , = 0), and respondents only weight the initial risk 
and do not believe that the safer product variant reduces the 
risk (y' = 1, ,3 = 0). If the set of information influencing 
decisions is restricted to what is provided in the survey, the 
TABLE 3.-NONLINEAR ITSUR OF CONSUMER PRODucT RISK MODEL, 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES, AND ASYMPTOTIC STANDARD ERRORS 
Toilet Bowl Insecticide 
Cleaner Sample Sample 
Perception parameters 
& O.1O1b 0.438c 
(0.052) (0.037) 
0.693c 0.280c 
(0.069) (0.055) 
Utility function parameters 
(101 392.62c 850.80c 
(56.52) (373.16) 
4FY1 0.009C 0.028b 
(0.003) (0.015) 
4FYYI - 1.1E-3 -2.5E-3b 
(4.OE-4) (1.3E-3) 
Lla 563.67c 1559.48c 
(23.92) (92.63) 
4102 193.49 550.22b 
(123.02) (318.54) 
41Y2 0.026c 0.029c 
(0.007) (0.013) 
'1YY2 -2.9E-3c -2.4E-3c 
(8.8E-4) (1.1E-3) 
L2a 698.94c 1293.99c 
(53.55) (77.59) 
Notes: a Loss values are evaluated at sample mean for income. 
bCoefficients are statistically significant at the 95% confidence l vel, one-tailed test. 
c Coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% confidence l vel, two-tailed test. 
estimates have definitive implications with respect to three 
principal earning hypotheses. 
For the case 2 model, the value of cx is 4"r/(15/10,000) + 
-y". This term captures both the underlying risk beliefs and 
the role of the initial product risk information. Based on the 
estimates of &L = 0.101 (toilet bowl cleaner) and & = 0.438 
(insecticide), it cannot be the case that 4"r = 0 and y" = 0, 
but it is possible that one of them is. It is also clear that since 
B = 0.693 (toilet bowl cleaner) and 0.280 (insecticide), t" $ 
1.0, so that the perfect information case can be ruled out. 
Individuals do not act as if all of the information they use in 
evaluating the new product had the stated risk level associ- 
ated with it. 
Overall, the results are consistent with an intermediate 
model in which both the initial and the modified risk values 
enter. For both the case 1 and the case 2 models, the results 
are consistent with a mixed weighting scheme that might, for 
example, occur in a Bayesian learning context in which both 
pieces of product information enter. For the case 1 model, 
the proportional weight on the initial risk information is 0.10 
for the toilet bowl cleaner and 0.44 for the insecticide, and 
the weights on the new risk information are 0.69 for the 
toilet bowl cleaner and 0.28 for the insecticide. These results 
suggest that respondents believe the reduced risk informa- 
tion about the toilet bowl cleaner is relatively credible, 
whereas the insecticide risk perception amounts are more 
difficult to alter, perhaps because respondents believe this 
product is inherently risky. 
10 For example, in the case of W3, where both risks decrease to zero, 
5.9% of the toilet bowl subjects and 13.9% of the insecticide respondents 
give zero values. 
11 See Gallant (1975, 1986) for a description of the properties of this 
procedure. 
32 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
For the case 1 model, the values of & and 1B represent he 
proportional weights on each type of risk information, which 
theoretically should sum to 1.0 in a Bayesian learning model 
(see equation (1)). For the toilet bowl cleaner sample, & + 
13 = 0.794, with a standard error of 0.025, and for the 
insecticide sample & + B = 0.719, with a standard error of 
0.034. In each instance, the results are not consistent with 
the Bayesian learning model in which no prior risk informa- 
tion enters since the sum of the weights is significantly 
below 1.0. 
The behavior implied by the case 1 results is similar in 
general character to what Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
have termed "subcertainty," that is, the sum of the perceived 
probabilities for events that should have a combined probabil- 
ity equal to 1.0 is less than this amount. The estimates of the 
revealed risk perception relationships provide formal tests of 
these relationships against perfect information and Bayesian 
learning reference points, with implications suggesting that 
there are perceptional biases that may not be consistent with 
the usual rational economic models of behavior. As will be 
seen in the discussion of case 2, prior risk beliefs must play a 
role to avoid this anomaly. 
For the case 2 model one cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the results are consistent with a Bayesian learning approach. 
In the case 2 analysis, the estimated value & corresponds to 
the value of W4"r/(15/10,000) + y". In a Bayesian learning 
framework, the sum of *" + y" + t" should equal 1.0, but 
the empirical analysis makes it possible to calculate an 
expression that is somewhat different, as & + ,3 equals 
[W"r/(15/10,000)] + y" + c". The role of unobserved prior 
risk beliefs is influential. If the Bayesian assumptions are 
met, this expression will have a value below 1.0 if r < 
15/10,000, equal to 1.0 if r = 15/10,000, and above 1.0 if 
r > 15/10,000. 
To see how different implications from adherence to a 
rational Bayesian model can arise, consider the extreme case 
in which the value of r = 0. Then the results imply that 
y/(t4 + y + t) equals the estimated value of & in table 2 and 
t/(* + y + t) equals the estimated value of 13 in table 3. The 
Bayesian assumption that the relative informational weights 
(4", y", and c") sum to 1 will be satisfied if 1" = 
tp/(* + y + t) equals 0.21 for the toilet bowl cleaner sample 
and 0.28 for the insecticide sample. The relative weight t4" 
on the prior risk level r must satisfy minimum requirements 
when r = 0. If such conditions are met, the results may be 
consistent with a Bayesian model in which subjects bring 
prior beliefs about the product to the study, in addition to 
acquiring risk information based on the survey. 12 
The nature of the effect on risk perceptions is of consider- 
able interest as well. Perceptions are never so extreme as to 
fall outside of [0, 1]. Instead, the behavioral probabilities 
compress the values of the stated risk levels in the survey, 
leading to what we term the "probability compression 
effect." 
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the compression relation- 
ships. In each case, respondents act as if there were some 
positive risk of the product hat should be taken into account, 
and they then increase these risk perceptions linearly as the 
value of sj increases. Each of these lines is flatter than the 
450 line that would prevail if stated probabilities equaled 
behavioral probabilities. 
The effect of perceptional biases on the valuation re- 
sponses differs according to the distribution of these percep- 
tions for the particular sample. Table 4 reports the additional 
amount per year that respondents were willing to spend for 
products that has a decreased per-bottle risk of 5/10,000. The 
first column in table 4 presents the actual survey responses, 
and the second column presents the median increase in 
expenses that subjects would be willing to incur if the risk 
perceptions were adjusted for their perceptional bias. In the 
case of toilet bowl cleaner, the adjustment for perceptional 
bias is not statistically significant, but for insecticide the 
willingness to pay for the greater safety is significantly 
smaller. 
Willingness to pay for changes in risk consequently may 
be distorted by the presence of these inadequacies in risk 
perception. This phenomenon is more than of academic 
interest, since it has implications not only for estimated 
risk-money tradeoffs but also for the degree and character of 
market failure. As the results in table 4 indicate, the extent of 
this influence may differ considerably depending on the 
particular isk context. 
IV. Implications 
The empirical innovation of this paper was to extend the 
analysis in Evans and Viscusi (1991) to jointly estimate the 
revealed probabilities and utility functions. The data require- 
ments for these estimates are fairly modest, as all that is 
needed is information that equates an individual's expected 
utility for two or more situations. The context considered 
focused on consumer product safety, but the results clearly 
have general applicability. 
This approach enables one to identify the role of percep- 
tional biases in apparent violations of the expected utility 
model. In each case it was possible to explore explicitly 
whether the results were consistent with a Bayesian formula- 
tion. Although the learning process is similar in many 
respects to a Bayesian learning process, it fell short if 
attention focuses on models in which the only information 
that matters is presented in the survey. The proportional 
information weights summed to less than their Bayesian 
value of 1.0. This suggests that either subjects are Bayesian 
who bring to an experimental study prior risk information 
that plays a substantial role or that the Bayesian model does 
not hold."3 
12 This hypothesis is consistent with the prospective reference formula- 
tion in Viscusi (1989, 1992). 
13 There could be other explanations as well. There could be specification 
errors due to the model's simplifying assumptions or a bias on the survey 
results that is not reflected in actual behavior. 
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FIGURE 1 -RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEHAVIORAL AND STATED PROBABILITIES 
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TABLE 4.-IMPACT OF PERCEPTIONAL BIAS ON SuRvEY RESPONSES 
Predicted Median Increase 
(Std. Error) in Yearly 
Expenses for a Decrease 
in Per-Bottle Risk to 5/10,000 
Assuming Stated Stated Risk Is Adjusted 
Sample Risk Is Accurate for Perceptional Bias 
Toilet bowl cleaner $ 8.32 $ 8.34 
(0.37) (1.06) 
Insecticide $ 3.92 $ 2.75 
(0.22) (0.34) 
Notes: Using parameter estimates from table 3, predicted values for W5 in equation (4e) are calculated 
for each respondent. In column 1 we assume consumers believe the stated risk qj = 5/10,000 is accurate. 
In column 2 we assume the stated risk is used in formulating the perceived risk as described in equation 
(3). The differences in the toilet bowl cleaner median values are not statistically significant where the 
insecticide value differences are statistically significant. 
There is also an apparent floor on behavioral probabilities. 
These values increase less than proportionally with either 
the stated or the assessed probabilities. 
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